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Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Guillaume Rocheteau () and Randall Wright ()

Econometrica, 2005, vol. 73, issue 1, 175-202

Abstract: We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second-order welfare losses. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equilibrium, and in competitive search equilibrium (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2003) Downloads
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