On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method

Yves Sprumont

Econometrica, 2005, vol. 73, issue 5, 1693-1712

Abstract: Each agent in a finite set requests an integer quantity of an idiosyncratic good; the resulting total cost must be shared among the participating agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method charges to an agent the sum of the prices attached to the units she consumes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.

Date: 2005
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