Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment

Adib Bagh and Alejandro Jofre

Econometrica, 2006, vol. 74, issue 6, 1715-1721

Abstract: A convex, compact, and possibly discontinuous better reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity that can be used to establish that a game is better reply secure and we show that this notion of continuity is satisfied by a large class of games. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Date: 2006
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