Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille ()

Econometrica, 2007, vol. 75, issue 6, 1591-1611

Abstract: We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems (2007)
Working Paper: Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems (2004)
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