Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Vieille ()

Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, issue 1, 29-69

Abstract: We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2009
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Working Paper: Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (2009)
Working Paper: Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons (2006)
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