Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information

Johannes Hörner and Stefano Lovo

Econometrica, 2009, vol. 77, issue 2, 453-487

Abstract: We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information (2007)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information (2007)
Working Paper: Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information (2006)
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