The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso V‰lim‰ki

Econometrica, 2010, vol. 78, issue 2, 771-789

Abstract: We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (97)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA7260 link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2009)
Working Paper: The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2008)
Working Paper: The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:2:p:771-789

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economet ... ordering-back-issues

Access Statistics for this article

Econometrica is currently edited by Guido Imbens

More articles in Econometrica from Econometric Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().