Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: A Comment

Martin Pesendorfer and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler

Econometrica, 2010, vol. 78, issue 2, 833-842

Abstract: Recursive procedures which are based on iterating on the best response mapping have difficulties converging to all equilibria in multi-player games. We illustrate these difficulties by revisiting the asymptotic properties of the iterative nested pseudo maximum likelihood method for estimating dynamic games introduced by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). An example shows that the iterative method may not be consistent. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2010
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