Monotonicity and Implementability

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim and Dov Monderer

Econometrica, 2010, vol. 78, issue 5, 1749-1772

Abstract: Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Date: 2010
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