Managers’ Entrenchment, Governance and Bank Performance
Aymen Mselmi and
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Aymen Mselmi: Department of Finance, Faculty of Economics and Management Tunis-el Manar, B.P 248, El Manar II, 2092 Tunis, Tunisia,
Boutheina Regaieg: Department of Finance, Faculty of Law, Economics and Management of Jendouba, Avenue U.M.A, 8189 Jendouba, Tunisia.
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 2017, vol. 7, issue 3, 233-246
This paper examines the relationship between managers’ entrenchment, governance and financial and stock market performance of Tunisian banking institutions listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange. We first propose to model the level of managers’ theoretical entrenchment. Second, we examine a panel data to determine the relationship between the different internal banking governance mechanisms, including managers’ entrenchment, on banking performance. To this end, our study examines a sample of 11 Tunisian banks over a period stretching from the first half of 2006 to the second half of 2013.The results indicate that “good” governance practice codes of banking institutions often represent poor performance. On the other hand, managers’ theoretical entrenchment contributes to improving the financial performance of Tunisian banking institutions.
Keywords: Banking Governance; Managers’ Entrenchment; Market Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G20 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eco:journ1:2017-03-31
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