Rethinking agency theory in developing countries: A case study of Pakistan
Amna Yousaf and
Accounting forum, 2018, vol. 42, issue 4, 281-292
We investigate if agency theory effectively explains agency conflict in the context of a developing country namely, Pakistan. Utilising data from 26 semi-structured interviews, we found that in Pakistan, there is no variation in risk preferences of principals (minority shareholders) and agents (majority shareholders). We also found that remuneration packages and board independence are not effective tools for governing owner managers in Pakistan. Thus, policy makers must shift their focus from soft internal governance mechanisms of appropriate remuneration and board independence. We propose for a rigorous external audit function, and appointment of independent directors and external audit firms by regulator.
Keywords: Agency theory; Developing countries; Board independence; Board remuneration; Principal-principal conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accfor:v:42:y:2018:i:4:p:281-292
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