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Compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards and auditor choice: New evidence on the importance of the statutory audit

Christopher Hodgdon, Rasoul H. Tondkar, Ajay Adhikari and David Harless ()

The International Journal of Accounting, 2009, vol. 44, issue 1, 33-55

Abstract: We examine the impact of auditor choice on IFRS compliance under the assumption of strict exogeneity of auditor choice. Our results reveal that compliance is positively related to auditor choice after controlling for firm size, profitability, leverage, degree of international diversification, and whether a firm has a U.S. listing or was audited according to International Standards of Auditing. We also find that auditor choice is positively related to firm compliance when controlling for unmeasured, firm-specific effects. The results of our study reinforce the importance of developing institutional mechanisms (e.g., enforcement, auditing, or corporate governance structures) to encourage compliance with IFRS.

Keywords: International; Financial; Reporting; Standards; IFRS; compliance; Auditor; choice; IASB; Voluntary; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accoun:v:44:y:2009:i:1:p:33-55

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The International Journal of Accounting is currently edited by A. R. Abdel-Khalik

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