Board Monitoring and Earnings Management Pre- and Post-IFRS

Antonio Marra, Pietro Mazzola and Annalisa Prencipe

The International Journal of Accounting, 2011, vol. 46, issue 2, 205-230

Abstract: In this paper, we address the question of whether the board of directors is more effective in constraining earnings management after the mandatory application of IFRS. Specifically, we explore how two board characteristics -- board independence and (2) the existence of an audit committee impact earnings management. Our empirical results suggest that board independence and audit committees play an important and effective role in reducing earnings management after the introduction of IFRS and that the accounting regulatory framework significantly contributes to the effectiveness of the two corporate governance mechanisms. Our findings also confirm that a company's corporate governance characteristics remain an important determinant of earnings quality; therefore, an analysis of the effects of new regulations must consider firm-level determinants.

Keywords: Board; independence; Audit; committee; Earnings; management; IFRS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accoun:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:205-230

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