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Corporate risk-taking, firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

Michael J. Imhof and Scott E. Seavey

Advances in accounting, 2014, vol. 30, issue 2, 328-337

Abstract: We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.

Keywords: Managerial earnings forecasts; Corporate risk-taking; Firm value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G39 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:advacc:v:30:y:2014:i:2:p:328-337

DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2014.09.004

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