A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies

Leif Appelgren

Advances in accounting, 2020, vol. 48, issue C

Abstract: The problem studied in this survey is how to optimize the allocation of audit resources over an auditee population with respect to available population statistics. The auditees are assumed to optimize their expected utility based on information about the audit strategy. This survey is limited to models where the auditee can vary the fraud amount along a continuous scale.

Keywords: Strategic auditing; Optimization; Game theory; Tax fraud; Social benefit fraud; Accounting fraud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 H26 K42 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0882611020300250
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:advacc:v:48:y:2020:i:c:s0882611020300250

DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100455

Access Statistics for this article

Advances in accounting is currently edited by Dennis Caplan

More articles in Advances in accounting from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().