Clawback policy enforcement: To disclose or not to disclose

Yunshil Cha, Susan Gill and Bernard Wong-On-Wing

Advances in accounting, 2023, vol. 62, issue C

Abstract: The SEC proposed in 2015 to require the disclosure of incentive compensation recovery efforts by companies' boards of directors. While such disclosure of enforcement can signal the effectiveness of corporate governance as the SEC suggested, firms have argued that the proposed enforcement disclosure may harm executives' reputation regardless of their involvement in misstatement because the clawback includes a no-fault clause. Results of our experimental study suggest that when the board does not disclose its clawback enforcement, investors perceive weak corporate governance, particularly when a restatement results from an intentional misstatement. This, in turn, leads investors to be less willing to invest than when clawback enforcement is disclosed. We also find that investors' perception of management reputation is not negatively affected following the board's clawback enforcement disclosure. Overall, our study provides insights into the potential effect of the SEC's proposal requiring the disclosure of clawback enforcement and addresses concerns raised in comment letters.

Keywords: Disclosure of clawback enforcement; Corporate governance; Management reputation; investors' decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:advacc:v:62:y:2023:i:c:s0882611023000202

DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100661

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