Social norms, tenure security and soil conservation: Evidence from Burundi
Gonne Beekman () and
Erwin Bulte
Agricultural Systems, 2012, vol. 108, issue C, 50-63
Abstract:
We use a new dataset from war-torn Burundi to explore how various institutional proxies affect investments in soil conservation. We “unbundle” institutions and distinguish between various proxies for tenure security and social norms. While we find significant correlations between certain proxies for tenure and social norms on the one hand, and investments in erosion management on the other, this is not true for all proxies. Using local conflict measures as instruments for institutional quality, we find tentative evidence of a causal effect of tenure security on erosion management, but not on investments improving short-term soil fertility.
Keywords: Erosion control; Tenure security; Customary land rights; Social norms; Institutions; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308521X12000091
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:agisys:v:108:y:2012:i:c:p:50-63
DOI: 10.1016/j.agsy.2012.01.001
Access Statistics for this article
Agricultural Systems is currently edited by J.W. Hansen, P.K. Thornton and P.B.M. Berentsen
More articles in Agricultural Systems from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().