Property rights enforcement and no-till adoption in crop-livestock systems

Nicholas Magnan ()

Agricultural Systems, 2015, vol. 134, issue C, 76-83

Abstract: In developing country agriculture property rights over crop residue left on privately farmed land are often poorly enforced, resulting in common grazing. The introduction of no-till agriculture, a technology that presents an alternative use for residue, may sufficiently increase its value so that farmers enforce property rights over this resource. Enforcement of property rights diminishes the amount of common residue available for grazing, and consequently makes the adoption of no-till by other farmers more costly. Using a model of property rights enforcement and technology adoption in a mixed crop-livestock system calibrated with data from Morocco, I demonstrate how one farmer’s no-till adoption can prevent other farmers from adopting and present some welfare implications of technology induced property rights enforcement.

Keywords: Common property resources; Crop-livestock farming; No-till; Property rights; Residue; Stubble (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:agisys:v:134:y:2015:i:c:p:76-83

DOI: 10.1016/j.agsy.2014.07.004

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