Flourish or flounder: Do trust-centric management controls encourage knowledge sharing and team performance?

Robin R. Radtke, Roland F. Speklé and Sally K. Widener

Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2023, vol. 107, issue C

Abstract: We examine whether combinations of trust-centric controls promote knowledge sharing behavior, and, in turn, team performance. Using multi-source data from 138 business unit management teams (534 total respondents), we find that in-team clan control and in-team monitoring are positively associated with team performance via knowledge sharing, while the relative emphasis on team-based incentives is not. We also find that team-based incentives and in-team clan control are substitutes, while in-team monitoring complements both team-based incentives and in-team clan control. These results show that trust-centric controls can encourage knowledge sharing; moreover, in-team monitoring is important to getting the most benefit from using team-based incentives or in-team clan control. However, firms can make substitution choices between in-team clan control and team-based incentives as they both encourage a shared purpose.

Keywords: Management controls; Knowledge sharing; Informal versus formal controls; Teams; Complementarities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s0361368222000964

DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2022.101429

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