Can directors' self-interests influence accounting choices?
James E. Hunton and
Jacob M. Rose
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2008, vol. 33, issue 7-8, 783-800
Abstract:
Eighty-eight audit committee members participated in an experiment designed to investigate the effects of audit issue (adjustment versus restatement) and director status (single directorship versus multiple directorships) on the likelihood of accepting an auditor's recommendation. Results indicate that all participants are less likely to accept an auditor's restatement recommendation than adjustment recommendation. Further, directors holding multiple directorships are less likely to accept an auditor's restatement recommendation than directors with a single directorship. Analysis of post-experiment clinical debriefing items indicates that directors with multiple directorships are less willing to support restatements due to the potential adverse effects of restatements on their reputation capital.
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:33:y:2008:i:7-8:p:783-800
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