The impact of auditor rotation on auditor-client negotiation

Karl J. Wang and Brad M. Tuttle

Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2009, vol. 34, issue 2, 222-243

Abstract: This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor-client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor's preferences than with the client's preferences and more negotiation impasses.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:34:y:2009:i:2:p:222-243

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