Cheating when in the hole: The case of New York city taxis

Shivaram Rajgopal and Roger White

Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2019, vol. 79, issue C

Abstract: We examine the influence of rationalization on NYC taxi drivers’ decisions to cheat their customers. We find that cheating ramps up by an order of magnitude when taxi drivers are in settings where it is easier for them to view cheating as acceptable as opposed to dishonest. This finding provides field evidence support for the idea that self-concept maintenance plays an important role in preventing fraud, and that fraud in economic exchange multiplies when participants can rationalize cheating in a way that precludes it from affecting their self-concept.

Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:79:y:2019:i:c:s0361368219300650

DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2019.101070

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