 When the Boss is far away and there is shared pay: The effect of monitoring distance and compensation interdependence on performance misreportingJeremy B. Lill Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2020, vol. 86, issue C Abstract: This study examines the joint effect that probabilistic reviews and compensation interdependence have on misreporting. These two controls are often found in distributed work settings where employees have opportunity to misreport. In an experiment that holds the true detection rate equal, I find participants perceive a probabilistic review to be more effective (i.e., more likely to detect misreporting) when there is low versus high monitoring distance between a supervisor and employee. I also find low monitoring distance reduces misreporting when compensation interdependence is low. However, high compensation interdependence attenuates the effect of monitoring distance on misreporting. This suggests that, with respect to misreporting, probabilistic reviews and compensation interdependence are substitutes rather than complements within a control system. My study advances academics’ knowledge of this complex relationship and highlights the need for managers to consider this relationship when designing both control and compensation systems. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s0361368218301880 DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2020.101143 Access Statistics for this article Accounting, Organizations and Society is currently edited by Christopher Chapman More articles in Accounting, Organizations and Society from Elsevier |
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