RAM: A collection of mechanisms for (indivisible) resource allocation in oTree

Benjamin Pichl

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2019, vol. 23, issue C, 133-137

Abstract: The growing theoretical literature on mechanism design and especially on the allocation of indivisible resources has created the need for experimental testing of mechanisms that evolved from matching theory in order to investigate the mechanisms’ theoretical properties in practice. The collection of mechanisms offered by this package includes Deferred Acceptance, Gale’s Top Trading Cycles and the Boston Mechanism in the context of School Choice Problems and the University of Michigan Bidding System, the Gale–Shapley Pareto-Dominant Market Mechanism, and Random Serial Dictatorship in the context of multi-unit resource allocation. All standalone apps are easy to use, customizable for many purposes, and are implemented in the oTree framework.

Keywords: Experimental economics; Matching; oTree; Economic software (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:23:y:2019:i:c:p:133-137

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2019.05.006

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