t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments

Eiichiro Kazumori and Yaakov Belch

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2019, vol. 24, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides a brief introduction to t-Tree, a general auction software package that implements single-unit auctions, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions (“VCG auctions”), Simultaneous Multiple Round Auctions (“SMRA”), and Combinatorial Clock Auctions (“CCA”) used in transportation, logistics, procurements, and spectrum allocation. The critical contribution of t-Tree is that it can handle computational complexities of the winner determination problem in large-scale combinatorial auctions by natively implementing Zhong et al. (2004)’s combinatorial optimization algorithms. Thus researchers can study large-scale combinatorial auction mechanisms off the shelf using t-Tree.

Keywords: Experiments; Software; Combinatorial auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C87 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:24:y:2019:i:c:s221463501830203x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2019.100235

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