Point shaving in NCAA Men’s Basketball: Behavioral finance, scale, and deterrence
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2022, vol. 34, issue C
We examine point-shaving corruption in NCAA Men’s Basketball betting markets, which has persisted despite deterrence policies. We collect data on players indicted or implicated for point-shaving within the last 50 years and find that: (1) the act is significantly more common among senior, or final-year, players and (2) lack of deterrence leverage is an important factor in the representative player’s decision calculus. Lastly, we analyze properties of a potential behavioral finance policy to further deter point-shaving, whereby players receive a grant (athletic scholarship) that retroactively converts into a market-rate student loan given malfeasance. The policy’s deterrence properties are examined theoretically.
Keywords: Behavioral economics and finance; Financial market corruption; Financial market regulation; Sports betting; Match fixing; Point shaving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:34:y:2022:i:c:s2214635022000272
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