Nudging debtors with non-performing loans: Evidence from three field experiments

Andris Saulı̄tis

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2023, vol. 37, issue C

Abstract: This study aims to explore how various nudges that have successfully increased the payment discipline among borrowers with performing loans affect the behavior of the defaulted debtors. In three field experiments involving 32,000 borrowers, debtors were randomly assigned to receive reminders that used personalized language, mentioned economic consequences, and prosocial motives. In one experiment, the design of the envelope varied. The experimental results show that simply nudging defaulted individuals does not work. Although every next reminder that debtors receive increases the payment rate, the effect is rather small. Moreover, sending reminders when the promise to make a payment on a debt has already been made can trigger a repeated default. I also find that a red envelope design backfires on collection efforts. The findings offer a fuller understanding of the behavior of defaulted debtors and suggest policy implications in debt repayment and recovery of non-performing loans.

Keywords: Debt collection; Field experiment; Behavioral insights; Loan repayment; Nudging; Reminders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:37:y:2023:i:c:s2214635022000983

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100776

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