The effect of CEO overconfidence on turnover abnormal returns

Neslihan Yilmaz and Michael A. Mazzeo

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2014, vol. 3, issue C, 11-21

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on the market reaction to a CEO change within the firm. Some studies provide empirical evidence that irrational managers may engage in actions that can be detrimental to firm value while others suggest that an overconfident manager can increase firm value. We control for different turnover, governance and firm characteristics, and analyze the abnormal returns of S&P 500 firms in the event of a CEO turnover. We find that when an overconfident CEO is appointed to the firm there is a significant negative impact on firm’s stock price. Our results support the arguments against overconfident CEOs due to the possible future actions of the CEO that may decrease firm value.

Keywords: CEO overconfidence; Management turnover; Executive options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:3:y:2014:i:c:p:11-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2014.07.001

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