 Preferences for government regulation of pensions: What I want for myself and what I want for othersCarmen Sainz Villalba and Kai A. Konrad Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2024, vol. 44, issue C Abstract: This paper analyzes how financial literacy and the perception of own eccentricity in pension preferences relates to citizens’ desire to make own choices or to delegate these to the government. It also considers how these factors relate to what regulation citizens want for their co-citizens, and to what extent the regulation they want for themselves relates to the regulation they want for others. We find that respondents with more financial knowledge want less government regulation. Furthermore, those that perceive themselves as having different preferences than the average population want less government regulation. The amount of regulation that respondents want for themselves is highly correlated with what they want for others. However, some respondents hold different preferences for themselves than for others. Specifically, those that want less government regulation for themselves and have more financial knowledge want, on average, more government regulation for others. Keywords: Pensions; Savings; Pension regulation; Paternalism; Autonomy; Delegation; Financial literacy; Knowledge; Eccentricity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:44:y:2024:i:c:s2214635024000856 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2024.100970 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance is currently edited by Michael Dowling and Jürgen Huber More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance from Elsevier |
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