Preferences for government regulation of pensions: What I want for myself and what I want for others
Carmen Sainz Villalba and
Kai A. Konrad
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2024, vol. 44, issue C
Abstract:
This paper analyzes how financial literacy and the perception of own eccentricity in pension preferences relates to citizens’ desire to make own choices or to delegate these to the government. It also considers how these factors relate to what regulation citizens want for their co-citizens, and to what extent the regulation they want for themselves relates to the regulation they want for others. We find that respondents with more financial knowledge want less government regulation. Furthermore, those that perceive themselves as having different preferences than the average population want less government regulation. The amount of regulation that respondents want for themselves is highly correlated with what they want for others. However, some respondents hold different preferences for themselves than for others. Specifically, those that want less government regulation for themselves and have more financial knowledge want, on average, more government regulation for others.
Keywords: Pensions; Savings; Pension regulation; Paternalism; Autonomy; Delegation; Financial literacy; Knowledge; Eccentricity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:44:y:2024:i:c:s2214635024000856
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2024.100970
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