 Financial incentives for delaying the public pension claiming ageTomoki Kitamura and Kunio Nakashima Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2025, vol. 45, issue C Abstract: We investigate whether financial incentives can prompt senior workers to delay claiming public pension benefits in Japan. We explore two types of incentives: increasing public pension benefits beyond actuarial adjustments and offering discounts on investments for short-term personal insurance products that provide a stable cash flow until the pension-claiming age. Utilizing choice experiments conducted through an original internet survey of Japanese employees, we demonstrate that these incentives effectively increase the pension-claiming age. Specifically, a 1.2 % increase in pension benefits or a 19.4 % additional yield on short-term personal insurance is necessary to delay claiming by one year on average. Moreover, incentives for insurance products are more cost-effective for the government. Our findings also reveal significant heterogeneity in financial incentive preferences among individuals, influenced by factors such as survival probabilities, trust in public pensions, and socioeconomic status. Keywords: Public pension; Retirement planning; Pension deferral strategies; Financial incentives in retirement; Choice experiment; Willingness to accept (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:45:y:2025:i:c:s2214635024001242 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2024.101009 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance is currently edited by Michael Dowling and Jürgen Huber More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance from Elsevier |
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