 The effects of public disclosures and information acquisition on price informativeness in a multi-attribute asset marketDouglas Davis, Oleg Korenok and John Lightle Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2025, vol. 47, issue C Abstract: We report a laboratory experiment that evaluates the impact of public information disclosures on a real decision maker’s capacity to learn about the components of a multi-attribute asset in an environment with endogenous information acquisition. The environment, inspired by Goldstein and Yang (2019), features an asset of uncertain value that consists of two inseparable components. A real decision maker has much more precise information than the market about one component, but no better information than the market about the other. Following the release of the public signal, speculators make private information acquisition decisions for each component. The model predicts that to best learn about the value of the component for which they are relatively uninformed, the real decision maker should disclose information about that which they know more. Despite smaller than expected differences in prices across treatments, experimental results largely support this prediction. Keywords: Information disclosures; Real feedback effects; Information aggregation; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:beexfi:v:47:y:2025:i:c:s2214635025000656 DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2025.101084 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance is currently edited by Michael Dowling and Jürgen Huber More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance from Elsevier |
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