Online judicial auction, loan availability, and corporate investment in China
Yongwei Ye,
Dongmin Kong,
Renzhi Li,
Xiaofan Li and
Yunqing Tao
The British Accounting Review, 2024, vol. 56, issue 6
Abstract:
Online judicial auctions can significantly impact corporate investment by enhancing creditor protection and facilitating loan availability. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the reform significantly boosts corporate investment. Mechanism tests reveal that the reform boosts corporate investment by improving corporate loan availability and creditors' willingness to lend. The effect is more pronounced in regions with high judicial auction turnover, high public participation, poorer legal environments, and lower banking competition, suggesting that these reforms enhance legal system efficiency and market competition. Additionally, we find that judicial auction reform reduces firms’ precautionary savings and fosters regional economic development. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the important role of creditor protection in corporate investment and provides insights for implementing digital judicial reforms.
Keywords: Online judicial auction; Corporate investment; Loan availability; Creditor's right protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D22 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:bracre:v:56:y:2024:i:6:s0890838924002646
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101487
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