 The impact of lobbying on managerial short-term resource adjustment decisionsJohannes Voshaar, Thomas R. Loy and Jochen Zimmermann The British Accounting Review, 2025, vol. 57, issue 3 Abstract: This study examines the effect of political lobbying on firms' short-term resource adjustment decisions. Controlling for a wide range of known determinants of managerial cost behaviour, our results suggest that U.S. lobbying firms exhibit significantly less cost stickiness than non-lobbying firms. Lobbying reduces managers' "wait-and-see games" as they obtain preferential access to information on political and legislative processes. With early knowledge of impending (political and regulatory) threats and long-lasting downturns, managers can adjust unutilised capacity more swiftly. This effect is more pronounced for firms without alternative information channels like permanent exchange with regulators. Our findings hold for several robustness checks, for instance, controlling for potential sample selection bias or employing alternative measures of lobbying as well as (political) uncertainty and alternative samples. Keywords: Cost behaviour; Cost stickiness; Lobbying; Political connections; Resource adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:bracre:v:57:y:2025:i:3:s0890838924001409 DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101391 Access Statistics for this article The British Accounting Review is currently edited by Nathan Lael Joseph and Alan Lowe More articles in The British Accounting Review from Elsevier |
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