Foreign direct investment, fiscal decentralization and land conflicts in China

Yan Wu and Nico Heerink

China Economic Review, 2016, vol. 38, issue C, 92-107

Abstract: Land disputes have been an important risk to social stability in China since the turn of the century. This paper uses provincial data on illegal land uses during the period 1999–2010 as a proxy for the intensity of land conflicts to investigate the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and fiscal decentralization on jurisdictional land conflicts. The results show that the FDI growth rate has a positive and significant impact on the growth rate of illegal land use when there is a high degree of fiscal decentralization. We thus provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that regional competition for FDI, as shaped by fiscal decentralization, tends to raise conflicts over land in China.

Keywords: FDI; Fiscal decentralization; Land conflicts; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 R11 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X15001546
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chieco:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:92-107

DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2015.11.014

Access Statistics for this article

China Economic Review is currently edited by B.M. Fleisher, K. X. D. Huang, M.E. Lovely, Y. Wen, X. Zhang and X. Zhu

More articles in China Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().