Information disclosure and public participation in environmental management: Evidence from the river chief system in China

Yazhou Liu, Yunqian Cheng, Tianshu Li, Jinlan Ni and Stephen Norman

China Economic Review, 2024, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: This paper evaluates the River Chief System (RCS), an institutional innovation in river governance. The RCS mandates government disclosure of administrative responsibilities and invites public supervision. Our model expands the traditional public goods theory to a discrete choice application, highlighting the mechanism of RCS that can potentially lead to outcomes closer to the social optimal. Using resident questionnaires from Shanghai, our empirical analyses confirm improved water quality under the RCS. Moreover, we find that information disclosure increases residents' willingness and active involvement in river management, which implies a critical mechanism that may help maintain the long-term effectiveness of environmental policies.

Keywords: Water pollution; Information disclosure; Public participation; The river chief system; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 O13 Q25 Q53 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chieco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24000579

DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102168

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