The effect of government-firm relationship on pollution reduction: The role of official performance appraisal
Gaoyi Lin,
Changtuo Xu,
Hailin Chen and
Kai Tang
China Economic Review, 2024, vol. 87, issue C
Abstract:
This paper investigates the unexpected positive effect of the government-firm relationship on environmental governance in the context of the reform of official performance appraisal (OPA) in China. In 2013, the central government launched an OPA reform that aimed to reduce the dependence on GDP growth and increase the focus on environmental protection in the appraisal process. According to the empirical results, in cities with mayors who have promotion incentives, firms that received favor from local governments can significantly reduce air pollutant emissions after the OPA reform. These findings remain robust even after conducting various tests, such as parallel trend test, omitted variables, and alternative explanations. This paper demonstrates that a reciprocal relationship between governments and firms can benefit society with the appropriate incentives.
Keywords: Official performance appraisal; Government-firm relationship; Pollutant emissions; Environmental governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chieco:v:87:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24001329
DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102243
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