Contractual corporate governance
Marc Goergen and
Luc Renneboog
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008, vol. 14, issue 3, 166-182
Abstract:
Companies have the choice to deviate from their national corporate governance standards by opting into another system. They can do so via contractual devices - such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, (re)incorporations, and cross-listings - which enable them to choose their preferred level of investor protection and regulation. This paper reviews these three main contractual governance devices, their effect on value, and whether their adoption by firms induces a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Indeed, firms may opt for less shareholder-orientation or investor protection (shareholder-expropriation hypothesis) rather than for more stringent rules that require firms to focus on shareholder value (bonding hypothesis).
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929-1199(08)00038-2
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Contractual Corporate Governance (2008) 
Working Paper: Contractual Corporate Governance (2008) 
Working Paper: Contractual Corporate Governance (2008) 
Working Paper: Contractual Corporate Governance (2008) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:14:y:2008:i:3:p:166-182
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter
More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().