The reputation of underwriters: A test of the bonding hypothesis

Gilberto Loureiro

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2010, vol. 16, issue 4, 516-532

Abstract: In the spirit of the Bonding Hypothesis proposed by Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999, 2002), I find that foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. and undertake IPOs are more likely to employ reputable underwriters if the firms come from countries with poor shareholder protection. The additional monitoring provided by reputable underwriters may help overcome the skepticism of U.S. investors, and partially explains the higher valuation these firms obtain after the offering. There is, however, a price to pay for this bonding benefit. I find that issuers from countries with weaker shareholder protection tend to be more underpriced if they are sponsored by prestigious underwriters.

Keywords: Bonding; hypothesis; Underwriter; reputation; IPOs; Cross-listing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929-1199(10)00038-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:16:y:2010:i:4:p:516-532

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter

More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().