Acquisitions and CEO power: Evidence from French networks

Sabrina Chikh and Jean-Yves Filbien

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, vol. 17, issue 5, 1221-1236

Abstract: During mergers and acquisitions, the CEOs of the acquiring firms are likely to cancel the deal if the market does not react favorably to its announcement. Using a sample of French acquisition announcements during the period from 2000 to 2005, this paper studies the conditions in which CEOs are more willing to listen to investors. Furthermore, according to the strong networks developed through French elite schools' alumni and board ties, the well-connected CEOs are more likely to complete any deal in spite of a negative market reaction to acquisition announcements.

Keywords: Acquisitions; CEO power; Corporate governance; Learning; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (63)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:17:y:2011:i:5:p:1221-1236

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.007

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