Corporate hedging and the cost of debt
Jun Chen and
Tao-Hsien Dolly King
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014, vol. 29, issue C, 221-245
Abstract:
For a large sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2009, we empirically examine the impact of corporate hedging on the cost of public debt. We find strong evidence that hedging is associated with a lower cost of debt. The negative effect of hedging on the cost of debt is consistent across industries, and remains economically and statistically significant under various controls and econometric specifications. A cross-sectional analysis based on propensity score matching suggests that hedging initiation firms experience a drop in cost of debt, while suspension firms sustain a jump. We confirm our findings after employing an extensive array of models to address potential endogeneity. The influence of hedging on cost of debt is mainly through the lowering of bankruptcy risk and agency cost, and the reduction in information asymmetry. Finally, hedging mitigates the negative effect of rising borrowing costs on capital expenditure and firm value.
Keywords: Hedging; Cost of debt; Financial risk; Agency costs; Information Asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:221-245
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.09.006
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