What determines the allocation of managerial ownership within firms? Evidence from investment management firms

Stephen Dimmock, William Gerken and Jennifer Marietta-Westberg

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, vol. 30, issue C, 44-64

Abstract: We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers: with both executive and operational responsibilities; when benefits of cooperation are higher; and with large contributions to firm value. Consistent with career concerns, we find increases in a manager's ownership are associated with increases in unsystematic risk. Ownership dispersion within the firm is associated with the allocation of monitoring and operational roles and the potential benefits of cooperation.

Keywords: Manager ownership; Managerial ownership; Employee ownership; Agency; Incentives; Institutional investment managers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 G23 G3 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:30:y:2015:i:c:p:44-64

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.11.004

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