 Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?Bill B. Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Delroy M. Hunter and Yun Zhu Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017, vol. 46, issue C, 154-169 Abstract: There is scant evidence on how risk-taking incentives impact specific firm risks. This has implications for board oversight of managerial risk taking, firms' development of comparative advantage in taking particular risks, and compensation design. We examine this question for exchange rate risk. Using multiple identification strategies, we find that vega increases exchange rate exposure for purely domestic and globally engaged firms. Vega's impact increases with international operations, declines post-SOX, and is robust to firm-level governance. Our results suggest that evidence that exposure reduces firm value can be viewed, in part, as a wealth transfer from shareholders and debt-holders to managers. Keywords: Risk-taking incentives; Managerial compensation; Exchange rate exposure; Risk management; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:154-169 DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.06.015 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier |
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