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Geographic concentration of institutions, corporate governance, and firm value

Xiaoran Huang and Jun-Koo Kang

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017, vol. 47, issue C, 191-218

Abstract: We examine the impact of geographic concentration of institutional investors on corporate governance and firm value. We find that firms whose large institutions are closely located to each other experience more shareholder-coordinated activities before Schedule 13D filings, more concerted proxy votes against management proposals, higher forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, higher returns around CEO turnover announcements and Schedule 13D filings, and larger increases in Tobin's q. These results are robust to using the introduction of new direct airline routes as an exogenous source of variation in proximity. Our results suggest that geographic concentration of investors increases monitoring effectiveness.

Keywords: Geographic concentration; Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Shareholder coordination; CEO turnover; Proxy voting; Free-rider problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G20 G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:47:y:2017:i:c:p:191-218

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