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She is mine: Determinants and value effects of early announcements in takeovers

Nihat Aktas, Guosong Xu and Burcin Yurtoglu

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018, vol. 50, issue C, 180-202

Abstract: Some bidders voluntarily announce a merger negotiation before the definitive agreement. We propose an “announce-to-signal” explanation to these early announcements: they allow bidders to signal to target shareholders high synergies so as to overcome negotiation frictions and improve success rates. Consistent with signaling, we show that negotiation frictions predict earlier announcements. Early announced transactions are associated with higher expected synergies, offer premium, completion rates, and public competition. Moreover, bidder announcement returns do not suggest overpayment and the existence of agency issues in these transactions. Taken collectively, our findings rule out alternative explanations such as managerial learning from investors and jump bidding.

Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Early announcement; Signal; Negotiation frictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D82 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:50:y:2018:i:c:p:180-202