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The consequences of shifting the IPO offer pricing power from securities regulators to market participants in weak institutional environments: Evidence from China

Jun Chen, Bin Ke, Donghui Wu and Zhifeng Yang

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018, vol. 50, issue C, 349-370

Abstract: We examine the consequences of shifting the IPO offer pricing power from securities regulators to market participants in a representative weak investor protection country, China. We show IPO offer prices relative to reported earnings are less depressed when determined by market participants than by securities regulators. IPO firms are also less likely to select a low quality auditor or inflate the pre-IPO earnings when IPO offer prices are determined by market participants. However, we find no evidence that IPO offerings are more likely to be overpriced when offer prices are determined by market participants. Furthermore, IPO firms' financial reporting choices made at the time of the IPO have a long lasting impact on the firms' subsequent financial reporting quality. Overall, our results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriate roles of securities regulators versus market forces in protecting public investors in markets with weak institutional environments.

Keywords: IPO regulation; Financial reporting quality; Auditor choice; IPO offer pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:50:y:2018:i:c:p:349-370

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.007

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