EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do executives benefit from shareholder disputes? Evidence from multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed firms

Yuanli Fang, Maggie Hu and Qingsen Yang

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018, vol. 51, issue C, 275-315

Abstract: Prior research documents that ownership by multiple large shareholders (MLS) could alleviate agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and small shareholders through improved monitoring. We provide evidence of a “dark side” to MLS. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2005–2014, we find a positive association between the presence of MLS and excess executive compensation. Furthermore, excess compensation is greater in firms in which the different types of large shareholders have relatively equal voting power. Overall, these results imply that coordination friction among MLS reduces large shareholders' monitoring efficiency and exacerbates agency problems between shareholders and executives.

Keywords: Multiple large shareholders; Shareholder identity; Excess compensation; Chinese firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917306429
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:275-315

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter

More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2018-11-10
Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:275-315