Evasive shareholder meetings and corporate fraud

Yong Kyu Gam, Paramita Gupta, Jieun Im and Hojong Shin

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021, vol. 66, issue C

Abstract: We examine how evasive shareholder meetings are related to the likelihood of committing corporate fraud. In this study, we use changes in corporate policy to hold an AGM on certain popular dates as a proxy for evasive management practices. We find that the positive implications of strategic AGM scheduling for committing corporate fraud are greater for firms that hold their AGM away from headquarters, firms managed by professional CEOs, and firms whose AGM agendas include audit election or dismissal. The positive correlations are, however, less likely when evasive practices are spread throughout the same industry.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Annual general meeting; Evasive shareholder meeting; Corporate fraud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119920302510
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0929119920302510

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101807

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Corporate Finance is currently edited by A. Poulsen and J. Netter

More articles in Journal of Corporate Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().