Boards of Banks

Daniel Ferreira, Tom Kirchmaier, Daniel Metzger and Shiwei Ye

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2025, vol. 94, issue C

Abstract: Bank board directors are highly independent but possess limited prior banking experience. Using a sample of banks from 90 countries between 2000 and 2020, we find that country-specific characteristics explain most of the cross-sectional variation in bank board independence. In contrast, country characteristics have little explanatory power for boards’ banking experience. While we document evidence of international convergence in bank board independence, U.S. banks lag behind their global counterparts in director banking experience. The data suggest that country-specific laws and regulations primarily shape bank board composition through requirements for director independence.

Keywords: Boards; Directors; Bank governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:corfin:v:94:y:2025:i:c:s0929119925001075

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102839

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