Preference based vs. market based discrimination: Implications for gender differentials in child labor and schooling

Alok Kumar ()

Journal of Development Economics, 2013, vol. 105, issue C, 64-68

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of son-preference by parents and earnings function bias on child labor and schooling in a model in which parents are altruistic. It finds that son-preference leads to gender differential in child labor with female children working more than male children. But it does not lead to gender differential in schooling, except when the bequest constraints are binding. On the other hand, the earnings function bias results in gender differential in both child labor and schooling. Dowry and marriage expenses can lead to inefficiently low level of schooling and high level of child labor. Son-preference magnifies gender differential in child labor and schooling in the presence of dowry and marriage expenses.

Keywords: Son-preference; Earnings function bias; Schooling; Child labor; Dowry; Marriage expenses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 I20 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:64-68

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.07.004

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