Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay

Jean-Philippe Platteau, Vincent Somville and Zaki Wahhaj

Journal of Development Economics, 2014, vol. 106, issue C, 250-263

Abstract: We investigate donor–beneficiary relationships in participatory development programmes, where (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite, (ii) the elite strategically proposes a project to the donor, knowing that the latter has imperfect knowledge of the needs of the target population.

Keywords: Community-driven development; Aid effectiveness; Elite capture; Preference targeting; Information distortion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay (2013)
Working Paper: Elite Capture Through Information Distortion: A Theoretical Essay (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:106:y:2014:i:c:p:250-263

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.002

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